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1. Basic criticism of Heidegger's nnti-representationalism
Representations are freely postulated in todays philosophy ofmind and cognitive science. They
are ubiquitous in many kinds ofphilosophical theories about the mind and in scientific theories
about a very large number of mental processes. It is fair to say that the presence of connectio-
nist approaches to cognitive phenomena has not put a halt on their use, nor does the dispute
around connectionism mean an immediate threat to a realist view of the mind. This pervasive
presence of representations makes that the neo-Cartesian view of the mind —as some philo¬
sophers call it (e.g. García-Carpintero 1995) on account of its realism— corrects in important
ways the classical Cartesian picture, since the representations involved are representations of
discrete items that are seen by many as independent from the mind and in this sense objective.
In the central cases, they are also external to the body of the cognizer, and for the most part
they are so that the subject has no conscious access to what the representations represent, and
in any case, conscious awareness is not necessary. All these features of representations make it
rather obvious to call them anti-Cartesian representations. We could then say that —even if
there are of course disenting voices— much of present day opinion about the mind has it that
corrections to Cartesian ontology which are nowadays perceived as necessary do not at all jeo¬
pardize the possibilities of a science of the mind.
Present day externalism about mental states —the view that that they are environment
dependent, to put it broadly— is indeed an important correction to Descartes.' It is so both
because of its epistemological and antropological consequences. But it admitedly presupposes
a universe of representable entities, primarily material or spatio-temporal objects; and so, it
does not represent, so to speak, a maximum of anti-Cartesianism, at least not from an ontolo-
gical viewpoint. Rather, at the far end —the most radical— of the spectrum of anti-Cartesian
positions, we find Heidegger's criticism of Cartesian ontology, which Heidegger conceived as
epitomizing the history ofWestern ontology.
According to Heidegger, both mental entities and physical objects are regarded by the
Cartesian tradition as ocurrent or present-at-hand (vorhanden). This tradition includes not
only Descartes himself, but his empiricist rivals, and also Kant (cf. SZ, 203-4). Indeed, it
could even be seen to encompass the whole of Western ontology since Parmenides, up until
Sind und Zeit (SZ, henceforth; see, e. g., SZ, p. 100). But entities are more fundamentally
encountered as available or ready-to-hand (zuhanden). The difference between being present-
at-hand and being ready-to-hand emerges only as a result of reveiling the particular way in
which human beings are in the world, and is involved in the complex structure that the world
in which human beings are involved turns out to be, according to Heidegger (cf. Brandom
1992, especially 50-52, for a particularly conspicous account of the structure at issue).
*
Research for this paper has been funded by the Spanish Government's DGICYT, Ministry of Education, through
research project PB94-0717.1 thank Olga Fernández Prat for valuable comments on a former draft of the paper.
1 See Burge (1986a), (1986b), and McDowell (1987) for different views —moderate and radical, respec¬
tively— of external Ism, indeed, of what I am calling here 'anti-Cartesian representation'.
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Roughly, to be ready-to-hand is like it is for us, for example (an important kind of
example), a piece of equipment (a tool) when it is being used to carry out a task. The tool is
involved in a particular way in our task, and we are concentrated using it, not watching it. The
tool is one in an equipment whole, and plays a complex role or is peculiarly involved in a task
for which that equipment whole is used. Piece of equipment and equipment wholes have
meaning in socially defined tasks. This characterizes partially the way in which we, basically,
"encounter" —a technical term— items in the world. This basic way is not the way of deta¬
ched contemplation but of concernful handling. As against this, to be an object of detached
contemplation is a central exemple of being ocurrent (present-at-hand). But, according to
Heidegger, objects appear to us as ocurrent only through a process of decontextualization
from the kind of situations in which they are encountered ready-to-hand. Being ready-to-hand
is thus ontologically more basic than being present-at-hand or ocurrent. Correspondingly, the
kind of knowing to which we apply the ordinary term "know how' is more basic than theore¬
tical knowledge, knowing of facts and knowing of things.
Heidegger conceives the primacy of the practical in extreme terms, along the lines sketched
above. Indeed, he takes it as denying that representation takes place at the fundamental level.
Since representation would imply a representing subject, this would amount to recognize a dis¬
tinction between subject and object that would be frontally opposed to the way in which he
views "our" fundamental implications with the world, or the way "we" encounter objects.2
Now, even if the exposition and critical appraisal of Heidegger's ontology in SZ is, of
course, an enormous task, we can give candidly the reasons for being against his radical
opposition to Cartesian ontology, vindicating at the same time the comparatively less radi¬
cal position of anti-Cartesian representation if we focus on the consequences of his views
just described.
Think then of an artisan busily trying to hammer a nail. Suppose he is under the effect of
alcohol, so that his movements are clumsy, applying more or less force than required, striking
the nail at the wrong angle, hitting sometimes the fingers with which he is holding the nails,
missing altogether occasionally, etc. The drunken artisan is maken a mess because he is unable
to estimate correctly the distance between, say, his elbow and the nail, the direction of the nail,
its position, etc. When he is not drunken, he is skillfull and things go smoothly. He is then
(unconsciously) estimating all those parameters correctly.
What this case makes clear is that there is a lot of (egocentric) representation going on in
a simple act of hammering a nail. We cannot account for this act in terms of pure dispositions
to act. There are correctness conditions for the estimated distances, angles, positions. They may
be right or wrong. And where we have correctness conditions we have content.3
Think the issue this way. For explaining many of our simple actions we must take into
account what Campbell calls 'causal indexicals'. Some things we consider heavy, light, too
heavy, too hot, etc. If I reckon a thing as too heavy for me, this has immediate consecuences
for my actions; most obviously, (ceteris paribus) I will not try to lift it. If a thing is simply
"heavy" I may try to lift it, but 1 will prepare accordingly by my making my arm ready to
1 Notice the scare-quotes here around the personal pronouns. Heidegger, of course, writes 'Dasein' instead,
trying not to presuppose the notion of a subject. In general, I will leave the personal pronouns in place (without
the scare quotes). And, other than in quoting Heidegger, I will use 'Dasein' only when paraphrasing him.
3 See the analogous argument of Peacocke against O'Shaughnessy on knowledge of the position of our own
body in Peacocke (1992) pp. 92-93. Cf. also Campbell (1994), p. 116.
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apply a considerable force and my body to compensate for the weight. 'Heavy', 'too heavy*,
'too hot', and all the expressions that have this sort of direct connection to action are causal
indexicals.4
The significance of all those concepts is closely related to the implications for action. In
this sense they contrast vividly with more theoretical concepts, such as spatial relations like bet-
weenness, adjecency on incidence. But it is crucial to realize that they cannot be reduced to
their implications for action —they cannot be defined in terms of those implications— because
even in the cases in which they are involved, the actions depend also on our purposes.
Exactly as it happens with practical skills in general. Thus, even if there is all the difference in
the world between the way the practical knowledge a skillfull artisan applies and the know¬
ledge a detached theorist may have, there is still content in practical concepts, there is still right
and wrong, and so, there is still representation (cf. Campbell 1994, § 2.2). And, of course,
where there is representation there is a subject. Not a Cartesian subject, because we are not tal¬
king of conscious representations; but a subject nevertheless. And also, accordingly, a diffe¬
rence between subject and object.
2. Heidegger's views on spatiality
Even if comparatively small, a very significant part of the task of confronting Heideggerian
anti-Cartesian ontology can be carried out in a more detailed way by considering Heidegger's
views on space or spatiality.
1 hope that this will become apparent in the following discussion, but, to point to briefly
to some reasons for this claim, we have, first, to take into account the fact that some spatial
entities are primary examples of items ready-to-hand. Moreover, they have apparently some
of the character of ready-to-handiness even more basically than other ready-to-hand entities
(SZ, 104). Furthermore, the kind of spatiality that characterizes what is in-the-world, and, in
particular, human beings as beings-in-the-world (what Heidegger calls, at a point, "existential
spatiality"5) is taken to be more fundamental than the kind of spatiality we think about when
we characterize physical objects as spatial. What is more, in some respects the "construction"
of this sense of spatiality out of primary existential spatiality should be a kind of model for
the transition from what is ready-to-hand to what is ocurrent or present-at-hand. Thus, in focus¬
ing on the subject of space and spatiality, we are not at the periphery but at the core of
Heidegger's ontological views.6
4 See Campbell (1994), §2.2 for this notion. Some of these causal indexicals are spatial causal indexicals:
'within reach', 'too far to reach' 'too wide to jump', 'to the right' and even, perhaps, 'at walk distance', or 'too far
to walk'. The first of these are egocentric spatial classifications, and so the considerations we will make in the next
section about the implications of recognizing an egocentric point of view apply here as well.
5 Cf. SZ, 56. "Existential spatiality" is revealed in the different ways of being in in which human beings are
in the world (and only through them). Examples of such ways (all of them belonging to the caring way of being)
are: "having to do with something, producing something, to look aller something and attend to something, employ¬
ing something, giving up and consider something as lost, undertake, imposing, examining, questioning,
considering, exposing, detennining..." (56-57). (All of the translations from SZ are my own, although I have taken
into consideration Dreyfus's tenrtinology and his translations of some passages.)
6 Of course, this is also true for time, but focusing on the views of time in Sein and Zeil would be not only to
enter into a much more intricate subject, but into a very different strand of Heidegger's ontology. Certainly, any¬
way, his views on space appear more tractable. Perhaps it is also appropiate to bring in here the following remark
by such an outstanding Heidegger scholar as Dreyfus: "The problems of this chapter [the one on Spatiality and
Space] can be seen as the sort ofdilïiculties that led Heidegger to abandon the project ofa fundamental ontology"
(Dreyfus 1991, 133).
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Although I regard the discussion of these views of Heidegger as paradigmatic and even
fundamental to any coming to terms with the ontology in SZ, my attempts here to bring the dis¬
cussion of spatiality to bear on the broader issue of Heidegger ontological views will be made
explicitly only in connection to their radical consequences mentioned in the previous section,
most specifically the blurring of the subject/object distinction.
Sections 22-24 ofSein undZeit, which are devoted specifically to the analysis of spatiality,
just follow section 21 entitled "Hermeneutic discussion of the Cartesian ontology of the world" in
which Heidegger presents Descarte's ontological views as the epitome of the western ontological
tradition that practically, since its inception, —Heidegger mentions specifically Parmenides—
would have overseen the "phenomenon of the world" as Heidegger conceives it In concentrating on
Descartes, Heidegger makes also clear that he is opposing his view of material objects as being
fundamentally objects of representation, as objects ocurrent or present at hand (cf. SZ, 99-100).
Contrary to Heidegger's high expectations for the analysis of spatiality, it seems to me
that it is at most of an antropological or psychological interest, because its relevance for onto¬
logy founders in view of a fundamental difficulty which I will try to make plain below.
Heidegger sets out to show that the specific spatiality of the beings encountered in the
environment [what Heidegger calls the "environmentality" or "aroundness" of the envionment]
is founded upon the worldliness of the world, and not, contrariwise, the world is ocurrent in
space" (SZ, 101-102). The point of departure for such an undertaking is an analysis of the spa¬
tiality of beings ready-to-hand in the world. It is this anaysis that will concern us here first.
Consider the philosopher at work sitting in her chair and writing at her desk. She has writ¬
ing tools in front of her perhaps paper and pen, —perhaps a personal computer, some books
more or less spreaded around on the table, perhaps some aditional pens and pencils, a couple
of folders, a bookrest, etc. She is busy working, using the pen or the computer—, and then the
books and the notebooks as tools, reading in them and writing. The things that are on the desk
build a totality of tools defined by the respective purposes of their being there, or, in other
words, the roles they play in the task at hand.7 "Inside" this meaningful totality, each thing or
tool has a place. It need not be a fixed, determined, place; it can "be somewhere around" ("liegt
Iteruni ") on the desk. That it has a place is clearly noticed for example, when something or
somebody intrudes and the thing is no longer where it belongs or "at its place" (maybe a child
has hidden the pen behind the computer).
We can say, with Heidegger, that the things (the tools) which our philosopher-writer is
using are near, in a distinct sense, not determined by distance. The computer before her in
which she is busy writing or the dictionary she sometimes consults is, in this sense, nearer than
the floor her feet are touching.
Again, with Heidegger we should say that the desk at which our philosopher is writing
constitutes a region (Gegend). A region of her house or of one of its rooms. But regions are not
defined by spatial situation in relation to reference objects. The desk could be in another part
of the room or in another room. "There, where the desk is", or "there, near the desk" are expres¬
sions that show how we treat the desk as a "region".
Places, defined with respect to a task and the totality of tools used in it, being near, in the
distinct sense not dependent of distance, and regions, as specific meaningful places where
7 SZ, § 18. The totality at issue is called by Heidegger an "involvement-whole" (Bewandtnisganzheit). For
Heidegger, involvements (Bewandtnisse) are such only inside an involvement-whole (p. 84). Involvements have
been interpreted as some kind of roles by Haugeland and other recent authors; see Haugeland ( 1992), p. 31.
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things or tools can themselves have a place, together characterize the specific spatiality of the
entities with which we have to do when busily involved in our tasks. In Heidegger's words:
This orientation of the multiplicity of places with respect to regions belonging to what is ready-to-hand
makes up the aroundness, the round-about-us of the entities that are encountered as nearest environ¬
mentally. (SZ, 103)
Things are spatial for us immediatly because they are "around" in this characterized sense.
The specific sense in which things are "encountered" as spatially situated is due to the
specific spatial way in which we (Dasein) are in-the-world. This way, in turn, is defined by two
features. One of them is a basic ability we constantly exercise. We bring things near to our con¬
sideration, when they satisfy the two conditions of being something with which we are busy
with, and something that absorbs our attention. The floor on which we step is usually not
brought near in this sense (neither condition is fullfilled), a friend in another city, in which we
are thinking, is also not brought near in the same sense (condition two is satisfied, but not con¬
dition one). We use constantly our senses of sight and hearing for bringing things near. Even
somebody heard in the radio can be brought near in that same sense, on Heidegger's explicit
admission (p. 105), and so, presumibly, somebody seen on TV.
This bringing near is called by Heidegger "Ent-fernung", in a word play that means lite¬
rally the abolishing of distance, but that in fact is something different from this. Of course, it
does not mean abolishing physical distance. It means making things present in the combined
sense described above. Even in this sense, however, distance is not "abolished", because
presence can be a matter of degrees. Expressions of everyday language, such as "that place is
only at walk distance", "it is only a jump to there", "within a stones throw" mark degrees of
"distance of something that has previously been dis-stanced".
To this "dis-stancing"8 we must add a second basic feature defining the specific spatial
way in which we are in-the-world. This is orientation (Ausrichtung). "Dis-stancing" is always
oriented. How is, however, this orientation to be thought of? It seems that Heidegger takes as
basic the orientation determined by the direction of a region: "Each bringing near has before¬
hand already taken a direction in a region from which what is dis-stanced comes close to us, so
that its place can be found with respect to it." (SZ, 108). As I read this difficult passage, "with
respect to it' (hinsichtlich) makes reference to the region.9
We may ask now which is the relation of this basic orientation with the directions which
we describe as "to the right" or "to the left"? Heidegger says that "Out of this orientation
arise the fixed directions of right and left. Just as with its dis-stances, Dasein constantly
takes these directions along with it." (SZ, 108) The use of the verb arise (entspringen) in the
first of these two sentences seems to indicate that orientation is somehow primary or more
fundamental than the directions,10 and "orientation with respect to a region" would provide
a more concrete content to the claim. But Heidegger does not explain the way in which
8 This is the translation favored by Dreyfus. See Dreyfus (1991), p. 130.
9 This interpretation provides also a way of interpreting an important claim that, otherwise, seems to remain
fully opaque. See next note and the corresponding text.
10 More explicitly this is brought up in the first sentence of the following passage (SZ, 109-110): "Deing
oriented to the right and to the left is founded in the essential orientation of Dasein, which in turn is essentially
co-determined by Being-in-the-World". The second sentence would perhaps point out to the basic determination
of orientation by the regions that I mentioned in the text corresponding to the previous note.
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right/left orientation "arises" out of this more fundamental orientation, be it orientation with
respect to regions or any other that can be found to fit Heidegger's claim. What is more, it is
not easyly seen how he could do this. How, indeed, could anybody give an account of the
orientation left/right to things from places conceived as "regions"?
The issue does not concern just left/right directions, but also front/back directions, and
perhaps, to a extent, also up/down. They do not seem to make sense without any reference to a
human body." Dreyfus notes the difficulty. He says that Heidegger "seems to hold that orien¬
tation is a result of the fact that not all equipment is accessible at the same time." (Dreyfus
1991, 137) The resulting "incompatible fields of action group simultaneously accessible things
together in opposed regions called right/left, and also front/back." He finishes:
But still without the body there could be no account of why there are just these regions. We would not
be able to understand, for example, why the accessibility of right and left is not symmetrical, or why
we must always "face" things in order to cope with them. On Heidegger's account these would just
remain unexplained asymmetries in the practical field. (Loc. cit.)
Dreyfus does not say which is the textual evidence for his claim that Heidegger "seems
to hold that orientation is a result of the fact that not all equipment is accessible at the same
time." Actually, what I believe we have evidence for, is the claim stated above that Heidegger
considers the directions up/down, front/back and right/left as somehow "generated" or "aris¬
ing" from regions. "Up', 'down' and 'back' are introduced in § 22, the first of the sections
devoted to spatiality, the very same paragraph in which "regions" are introduced. The lack of
mention of front seems entirely casual. It is true that 'right' and 'left' make their appearence
in the next section, in what appears to be a different context, and so, on first reading, it seem
as if they receive a different treatment in SZ. But I have explained why we must think other¬
wise, and the lack of reasons for differentiating it from the other directions (at least from
front/back) —implicitly recognized by Dreyfus in the above quotation— provides aditional
confirmation for linking them also to regions.
In any case, I fully concur with Dreyfus that Heidegger is in effect separating "the
issue of Dasein's embodiment from the issue of orientation" {loc. cit.). But this, rather than
merely "unsatisfying", which is Dreyfuss judgement about the situation, seems to me a
decisive mistake that points to what is erroneous with Heidegger whole approach. Indeed,
it does not seem that we can somehow add a human body to the Heideggerian picture and
make orientation basically dependent on it, leaving the remaining undisturbed, and so,
modifying the doctrine of orientation by relating it to human bodies would, in effect, imply
recognizing a primitive form of the distinction between subject and object which Heidegger
is at pains to deny.
To think of basic orientation in the new way is to think of orientation using an egocentri-
cal frame of reference. A basic form or orientation cannot presuppose a strong concept ofego
(not, then, a Cartesian ego!). It is certainly a problem how to characterize the ego of egocen-
11 THe case of up/down is special. Up and dow n directions seem to respond to mixed criteria. On the one hand,
'up' is not where the head is or 'down' w here our feet are, as it is easyly recognized ifwe think about giving these
directions when being or being inclined; it seems that the gravitational field is involved in detennining these direc¬
tions. But, on the other hand, there seems to be a sort or residual bodily reference in these concepts, as is seen in
the difficulties children or illiterate people have with antipodes (tales about they going "upside down" range from
worries to —at the very least— not understanding).
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trical.12 But however this may be characterized, the two main points to bear in mind here are,
first, that we would not act at all the way we do —a fortiori we would not go busily around in
the "circumspect" (umsichtich) way Heidegger takes as fundamental, were it not for the asym¬
metries of our bodies. And second, even ifwe finally were to arrive to the conclusion that the
egocentric axes cannot be defined in terms of the body or any of its parts, it is still true that they
cannot be eliminated in terms of spatial relations than are not egocentrally characterized (see
Campbell 1994 § 1.2 for a defense of this thesis).
Let us follow now again Heidegger's own steps to see the issue from another angle. He,
talking about the directions left/right, manifests his agreement with Kant13 on that a mere feel¬
ing of the difference between the two sides would not help for orientation (SZ, 109-110). Kant
puts forward the case of somebody to whom a room and its objects are completely familiar,
but that finds himself in it after the position of the objects in the room has been changed so that
they are disposed mirror-symmetricallly with respect to their former disposition. Kant claims
that even if he would immediatly feel the queerness, he would be able to orient himself only
after he remembers the (former) place of a concrete object of the room. In Kants words, he
needs for orientation a concrete object "whose place [he] has in memory". Again, Heidegger
agrees with Kant, but he finds that leaving things at that does not go to the root of the problem.
To appeal to memory, says Heidegger, is "at bottom an appeal to the existential constitution of
being-in-the-world". That is, appealing to memory makes sense only against the background
of the "oriented dis-stancing" that Heidegger's doctrine of space makes truly fundamental.
Kant does not bring out this existentiary constitution. It is true, says Heidegger, that Kant does
not focus on the meaning of orientation; he simply wants to show that each orientation needs a
subjective principle, which here should come to to saying that things are a priori oriented to
the right or to the left. Then, Heidegger concludes his comment on Kants position restating his
point in the following way:
However, the a priori character of the orientation to the right and to the left is founded in the "sub¬
jective" a priority of being-in-the-world, which has nothing to do with a determination w hich is limi¬
ted beforehand to a worldless subject (toc. cit.).
Focusing on this text will let to make clear what seems right and what wrong in
Heidegger's position. The text contains two claims. The second brings forth exactly the posi¬
tion to which the defenders of anti-Cartesian representation would agree with him. Indeed, they
could subscribe entirely to this claim: "That I am already in a world, is for the possibility of
orientation not less constitutive than the feeling of right and left (ioc. citf. But they would take
exception with the way in which Heidegger wants to conceive this constitution. And they would
be right to do so, because it does not seem that he can answer the question prompted by the first
sentence of the text above: how is orientation founded in the "subjective" character of being-
in-the-world? Rather, it seems that, as we have seen, we must take the right/left orientation (and
12 For example, there is no part of the body that can function well as a center for the frame for all cases. And
it can be that we must take the axes front/back, left/right and up/down as primitive, that is, as not defined in terms
of the body. Peacocke makes the first point in Peacocke(1992) S 3.1,, and Campbell argues forcefully for the the¬
sis that an egocentric frame (taking as basic the egocentric axes) is more fundamental than the notion ofbody-cen-
teredness in Campbell (1994), ¡¡ 1.2.
13 The reference is to "Was heiBt: Sich im Denken orientieren?" from 1786, vol. VIII, pp. 131-147 in the edi¬
tion of Kant's complete works by the Berlin Academy.
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the orientation with respect to the other egocentric axes) as fundamental. It seems then that we
cannot agree at ail with Heidegger's conclusion on this matter:
Distancing and orientation determine, as constitutive ingredients of the being-in, the spatial ity of
Dasein's being concernfully and circumspecte)ly in discovered innervvordly space. The explanation
given of the spatiality of what is innerwordly ready to hand and the spatiality of being-in-the-world
provides the presuppositions for making clear the phenomenon of the spatiality of the world and posing
the ontological problem of space. (SZ, 110)
The matter is not to be lightly taken, also in Heidegger's own count. If egocentric orien¬
tation turns out to be fundamental, then we should take out the scare quotes around 'subjec¬
tive' in Heidegger's text (see the quotation on Kant above), and give up his fundamental
opposition to the distinction between representing subject and represented object. Also, fur¬
ther, it will also turn out that there has not been a "phenomenon of the world" which has been
overseen in the ontological tradition of the western. The world has been recognized all along
as something in which we move and act, and to move and act in the way we do, we need to
have egocentric and non-egocentric representations which point to the borders between us
and the environment. Anything else of fundamental ontological import that Heidegger could
mean to have been forgotten by such tradition should rather be claimed under a less mislead¬
ing and also perhaps less flashy denomination.
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